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Influences on Affiliate HRM Systems in Japanese and American MNCs in Southeast Asia 
Using data from 160 Asian affiliates of American and Japanese MNCs, this paper explores the 
determinants of whether MNCs transfer their parent company HRM systems overseas or adopt 
local practices. We find that demographic predictor variables which have often been found in 
previous studies to predict similarity are relatively unimportant while perceived HRM 
competence of the MNC is an important determinant of HRM transfer. 
I. Introduction 
Two major new and interrelated themes in the global marketplace are international 
competitiveness and the expanding role of Multinational Corporations (MNCs) overseas (e.g., 
Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Ohmae, 1985). In today's global economy the MNC is perhaps the 
most important actor in the transfer of tangible and intangible goods across national 
boundaries. Since World War II foreign direct investment by MNCS has grown rapidly in 
developed and in developing countries. Not only has the total stock of capital grown rapidly, 
but there has been growth in the number of affiliates of MNCs, growth in the number of 
countries in which specific finns are active, and increasing diversity in the products 
manufactured and the goods and services sold abroad through the affiliates of MNCs. 
American MNCs became prominent in international business soon after World War II 
and have continued to expand their overseas operations over the past four decades. American 
finns are currently the biggest direct foreign investors, by far, worldwide and invested nearly 
$150 billion overseas between 1993 and 1995. 
The rise in Japanese MNCs, although much more recent, has been spectacular. Although 
Japanese finns did not begin to invest overseas in large numbers until the mid-1970s, their 
growth, particularly in the decade of the 1980s, has been rapid as they increasingly shifted 
from exports to overseas production, and from domestic production for the Japanese market to 
sourcing from abroad. Japanese MNCs took the world by stonn in the 1980s and today, they 
represent a fonnidable presence on the global economic landscape. Responding to the 
revaluation of the yen in 1986 with the Plaza Accord, Japanese finns responded with "over-
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courageous investment" (Doherty, 1995), expanding foreign direct investment (FDI) in North 
America, Western Europe, Southeast Asia, and other parts of the world. For example, in 
1979, total Japanese FDI worldwide totaled $4.995 billion. Ten years later, in 1989, it had 
skyrocketed to $67.54 billion (Keizai Koho Center, 1993: 54). 
Japanese firms have recently begun to incorporate FDI integrally into their corporate 
strategies. However, they are no longer expanding production capacities on a global basis; 
they are focusing on the Asian region and not on the advanced industrial countries (Doherty, 
1994). While the United States is still the largest recipient of Japanese FDI, current inflows 
of FDI in Southeast Asia are nearly equivalent to those in Europe. Asia today has become 
Japan's fastest growing market and investment destination, with total Japanese investment in 
ASEAN increasing from $2.71 billion in 1988 to a peak of $4.7 billion in 1989 and remaining 
relatively steady since 1990. In 1993 new Japanese FDI in ASEAN totaled $3.04 billion (see 
Table 1 below). American investment in Asia has also experienced a dramatic rise in recent 
years and still dwarfs Japanese investment in the region. Total American investment in 
ASEAN grew from $9.501 billion in 1988 to $20.517 billion in 1993 (see Table 1). 
Table 1: FDI Statistics 
About Here 
In addition to the push factors which have increased FDI from abroad, there are a 
number of pull factors drawing foreign direct investment to the region. Asia, particularly 
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those countries in ASEAN, are currently enjoying long-lived and fast-paced economic 
expansion while the American, Japanese and European economies are stagnating. In the early 
1990s, the economies of the member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) experienced the highest growth rates in the world (Yamazawa, 1994) and this 
growth is expected to continue well into the early 21st century. For example, predicted real 
economic growth for 1995 in the ASEAN countries is predicted to range from 5.5 % in the 
Philippines, 6.4% in Indonesia, 6.8% in Singapore, 7.9% for Malaysia and 8.2% in Thailand 
(Tan, 1994: 2). These figures compare with predicted real growth rates of 2.2 % for the United 
States and 2.7% for Japan (Tan, 1994: 2). 
With the high level of economic growth and increasing importance of Southeast Asia as 
an investment site, the relative performance of overseas affiliates in the region has become a 
critical management issue and important source of global competitiveness of MNCs. Despite 
the increasing importance of international operations and the management of an overseas 
workforce to the success, and indeed the very viability, of MNCs, there has been little recent 
empirical research on the management of Japanese and American affiliates overseas, 
particularly outside of the U.S. and Europe. The research study reported in this paper was 
conducted to begin to address this gap in our knowledge. This paper reports some of the 
results from a large-scale study of nearly 200 Japanese and American affiliates in Indonesia, 
Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines. While the study is quite comprehensive in 
its coverage, the results reported here focus exclusively on the determinants of the human 
resource management approaches of the affiliates in the sample. This paper seeks to answer 
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the following questions: 1. To what extent do MNCs transfer their parent company HRM 
systems overseas versus adopt local practices?; 2. What are the key determinants which lead 
MNCs to transfer their parent company HRM systems overseas?; 3. What are the key 
determinants which lead MNCs to use local HRM systems in their overseas affiliates?; and 4. 
Are there any differences in the above relationships between those affiliates with Japanese 
parent companies and those with American parent companies? 
In the following section, we first briefly describe a model of the determinants of the 
HRM system of overseas affiliates which is based on concepts from the resource based view 
(RBV) of the firm and on the resource dependence framework. Then, we present a series of 
hypotheses derived from the model. In the third section of the paper we describe the 
methodology of the study, the operationalization of the variables, and the empirical results. 
Finally, in the last section we present a discussion of the results and conclusions. 
II. Theoretical Framework 
MNCs and their overseas affiliates have garnered increased attention by academics in 
recent years (e.g., Hamel & Prahalad, 1985; Prahalad & Doz, 1987; Gupta & Govindarajan, 
1991; Kobrin, 1992; Rosenzweig & Singh, 1994). However, the field of international human 
resource management (IHRM) is still in its infancy. While a number of important theoretical 
and empirical contributions have been made in the past few years (e.g., Milliman, von Glinow 
& Nathan, 1991; Adler & Ghadar, 1991; Wright & McMahan, 1992; Schuler, Dowling & De 
Cieri, 1993), there is still little consensus in the field, and no common paradigm to guide 
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empirical research. Borrowing from organizational theory and the strategy literatures, the 
theoretical framework described below is based on two theoretical pillars: resource dependence 
theory and the resource-base view (RBV) of the firm. 
The RBV conceptualizes of firms as unique bundles of resources and capabilities that are 
the foundation upon which competitive advantage is based (Barney, 1991; Penrose, 1959; 
Werenfelt, 1989). A key tenet of the RBV is that competitive advantage is derived through 
resource accumulation and deployment. In order for competitive advantage to occur, 
however, the resource must be valuable, rare, imperfectly mobile, and inimitable (Barney, 
1991; Conner, 1991). Over time, firms accumulate unique combinations of resources and 
abilities which result in distinctive competencies (Selznick, 1957). These distinctive 
competencies are relatively immobile and differential mechanisms for resource combination 
and utilization, resulting in heterogeneity among firms, and, when they are not easily imitated 
or substitutable, can account for advantages over competing firms. 
Applying the RBV to the MNC, we can distinguish between three levels of resources 
which may result in competitive advantage, based on their place or origin (Taylor, et aI., 
1995). The first, home country-specific resources, are based in the particular configuration of 
economic, cultural, human, and other resources in the MNC's home country (Porter, 1990) 
and are available to all firms from that country. The second source of competitive advantage 
is at the parent company-level and represents the unique bundle of assets and capabilities that 
the MNC has developed over its lifetime. Finally, resources at the affiliate-level may 
provide a source of competitive advantage for the MNC both at the local level and at the 
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regional and/or global levels. The origin of the resource -- national, firm, or affiliate -- is 
likely to influence its usefulness in other locations and it ability to lead to competitive 
advantage for the MNC. Thus, all resources, including HR competence, vary in their level of 
context -specificity or generalizability, depending on their usefulness outside the location in 
which they were developed (Taylor et al., 1995). 
Because the HR system is "a repository of knowledge about firm-specific knowledge, 
skills, abilities, relationships, and the work-related values of its employees" (Lado and Wilson, 
1994: 709) it represents a potential distinctive competence. To the extent that HRM expertise 
and capabilities are immobile, they constitute a basis for sustained competitive advantage 
(Barney, 1991; Lado & Wilson, 1994; Ulrich & Lake, 1990). 
A critical decision MNCs have to make concerns what HRM system they will put in 
place in their overseas affiliates. The MNC can take a HRM system developed and perfected 
in the home country and export it overseas or it can emulate local companies in the host 
country environment and implement a system which is similar to HRM systems used in the 
local host country. Which choice will be successful depends on whether the HRM system can 
utilize human resources available in the local host country in a superior way to generate 
advantage over competing firms. While a number of authors have hypothesized that the mere 
presence of a competence will help determine whether it is will be transferred overseas, our 
own research has shown that it is top management's perception that it has a competence, 
regardless of the actual presence or absence of the competence, which is the critical factor. 
We therefore hypothesize that: 
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Hla: The greater the strength of top management's belief that the parent company possesses a 
competence in HRM, the more likely that MNC is to transfer its HRM system to its overseas 
affiliate, and hence, the greater the level of HRM similarity between the parent company and 
the overseas affiliate. 
In parallel fashion, we would expect that: 
Hlb: The greater the strength of top management's belief that the parent company possesses a 
competence in HRM, the lower the level of HRM similarity between the local companies and 
the affiliate. 
While we expect the above hypotheses to be true in general terms, there is substantial 
evidence that not all affiliates are created equal. Recent work in the international strategy 
literature (e.g., Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Gupta & Govindarajan, 1991; Rosenzweig & 
Singh, 1991; Roth & Nigh, 1992; Westney, 1990) suggests that MNCs should not and do not 
approach all of their affiliates uniformly. One critical underlying determinant is the level of 
resource interdependence between the parent company and the affiliate. 
The resource dependence approach (Aldrich, 1976, 1979; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) is 
based on the fundamental premise that an organization is unable to generate all of the resources 
necessary to maintain itself, and is therefore dependent on other actors in its environment. 
Organizational stakeholders will attempt to initiate control over the actors with whom they 
have exchanges in order to ensure that the resources necessary to achieve organizational 
objectives are obtained in an effective and efficient manner (Anthony, 1965; Green & Welsh, 
1988). 
According to this framework there are three key factors that determine the dependence of 
one actor on another (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). First is the importance or criticality of the 
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resource to the continued operation and survival of the operation (Blau, 1964; Thompson, 
1967). Second is the extent to which an interest group (or individual) has discretion over the 
resource's allocation and use (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Finally, resource dependence is 
determined by the extent to which alternatives to the resource are available (Blau, 1964; 
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Thompson, 1967), that is, its rareness (Barney, 1991). 
Because the parent company relies on its overseas affiliates for certain essential resources, 
the parent company is dependent to varying degrees on the resources controlled by the 
affiliates. As the parent company's dependence increases, the more control the parent 
company will want to exercise over the affiliate (Ghoshal & Nohria, 1989; Beechler & Yang, 
1994). 
The degree of dependence on the MNC on a particular affiliate, and hence the degree of 
control it will exert over the affiliate's HRM system, is determined in large part by the amount 
and direction of the resource flows between the parent company and the overseas affiliate 
(Gupta & Govindarajan, 1991; Beechler, 1990). While greater reliance by the parent company 
on resource flows from the affiliate will increase the parent company's desire for control, it 
simultaneously increases the power of the affiliate over the parent company (Gupta & 
Govindarajan, 1991). The resource dependence of the parent company on its affiliates is 
highest in those affiliates with the greatest inflows and outflows of resources to the rest of the 
organization and lowest in those affiliates with the lowest inflows and outflows of resources to 
the MNC. 
When the parent company is not dependent on the affiliate, there is little reason to 
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exercise high levels of control over the affiliate, particularly since control can be costly to 
exercise. However, as resource dependence increases, parent company control will increase. 
Therefore we predict that there will be a positive relationship between resource dependence 
and the exercise of parent company control over the affiliate, resulting in a higher the level of 
HRM system similarity between the affiliate and the parent company. 
Specifically we predict that: 
H2a: The greater the flow of resources between the parent company and the affiliate, the 
greater the level of HRM similarity between the parent company and the affiliate. 
H2b: The more the parent company relies on the overseas affiliate to achieve its organizational 
goals, the greater the level of HRM similarity between the parent company and the affiliate. 
However, there is an equally plausible counter-argument which leads to an alternative 
prediction regarding the relationship between resource dependence and HRM similarity. High 
levels of both resource inflows and outflows from the affiliate to the rest of the MNC result in 
the highest levels of resource dependence and will therefore lead to the greatest pressure on the 
parent company to control the overseas affiliate. At the same time, because the parent 
company is also dependent on the affiliate to supply needed resources to attain its 
organizational objectives, the affiliate possesses power to resist control efforts by the parent 
company. Therefore, we would expect that: 
H2c: The greater the flow of resources between the parent company and the affiliate, the lower 
the level of HRM similarity between the parent company and the affiliate. 
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H2d: The more the parent company relies on the overseas affiliate to achieve its organizational 
goals, the lower the level of HRM similarity between the parent company and the affiliate. 
Because of these equally-plausible scenarios we cannot, a priori, predict whether hypotheses 
2a and 2b or 2c and 2d will prevail. 
While the degree of control that the parent company wants to exercise over its affiliate 
depends on the level of resource dependence, the degree of control that the MNC can exert 
over its affiliates will be influenced by other constraining factors. Here, we focus on three 
major factors which can which influence the exercise of control: mode of entry (Rosenzweig & 
Nohria, 1994), level of expatriate presence, and level of parent company ownership (Milliman 
et aI., 1991; Rosenzweig and Nohria, 1994; Schuler et aI., 1993; Rosenzweig & Singh, 1991). 
We predict that an affiliate that is established as a greenfield (new) operation is likely to 
experience a higher degree of parent company control over its HRM system for several 
reasons. First, expatriates sent over to establish the affiliate are likely to utilize the HRM 
policies and practices that they know, leading to organizational imprinting (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 
1989; Stinchcombe, 1965). Second, a greenfield operation does not have to contend with 
employee resistance to a new system or organizational inertia, making it easier to institute 
parent company HRM policies and practices. On the other hand, a MNC that establishes an 
overseas affiliate in partnership with a local firm or that buys a pre-existing firm, will 
experience greater pressures to adopt local HRM policies and practices. 
H3: There will be greater similarity between a parent company I s HRM system and affiliate IS 
HRM system in those affiliates established as greenfield operations than in affiliates which 
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have been acquired or established as shared partnerships with other finns. 
H4: Affiliates founded as greenfield operations will have HRM systems with lower levels of 
similarity to local companies in the same industry than affiliates which were founded as 
acquisitions. 
Building on the argument above, since most expatriates have grown up in an environment 
dominated by their parent company's "way of doing things" they are likely to bring with them 
a parent company-dominated mental model of HRM. Local managers, on the other hand, have 
a mental model shaped by local company practices. Thus, we would expect that in those 
affiliates staffed with larger numbers of expatriates, the HRM system of the affiliate will be 
more similar to the parent company and less similar to local companies than in affiliates with 
fewer expatriates. We therefore hypothesize that: 
H5: The larger the expatriate presence in the affiliate, the higher the level of HRM similarity 
between the affiliate and the parent company. 
H6: The larger the expatriate presence in the affiliate, the lower the level of HRM similarity 
between the affiliate and local companies in the same industry. 
Finally, we predict that higher levels of capital ownership of the parent company will 
increase the ability of the parent company to control the affiliate. There will be greater 
pressures to adopt local HRM policies and practices when there is a local partner than when 
the parent company has complete ownership or a controlling interest in the affiliate. Hence, 
we predict that: 
H7: The greater the percentage of capital owned by the parent company the higher the level of 
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HRM similarity between the affiliate and the parent company. 
H8: The greater the percentage of capital owned by the parent company, the lower the level of 
HRM similarity between the affiliate and local companies in the same industry. 
III. The Study 
Methodology 
Data were collected from the foreign affiliates of American and Japanese MNCs in three 
major industries, two of the most global industries -- automotive and electronics, and one 
currently globalizing industry -- chemicals/pharmaceuticals. Data were collected by a 
multinational research team from the U. S., Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore and the 
Philippines using both structured face-to-face interviews and written questionnaires. Although 
qualitative and quantitative data were gathered in this study, the results reported here are based 
on quantitative responses to the written questionnaires. 
The first stage of the research consisted of interviews with over 30 top level executives in 
a non-random sample of Japanese and American MNCs in the region to learn what were the 
most pressing issues facing the affiliates. Using these preliminary data as a basis, 
questionnaires were constructed and then pretested by the multinational research team in each 
of the target host countries. The questionnaires were modified based on the feedback from the 
pretests and a common questionnaire and structured interview protocol were developed by the 
research team. Interviews were conducted in English, Japanese, and/or the host country 
language, depending on the nationality of the respondent. 
A stratified sampling strategy targeting the largest Japanese and American manufacturing 
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affiliates in each of the five countries was used. Using lists published by host country 
government agencies, Chambers of Commerce, JETRO, and major business magazines, 
Japanese and American affiliates with more than 100 employees in each of the three industries 
were identified. Faxes or registered letters were sent directly to the managing director of each 
affiliate, requesting participation and face-to-face interviews with the managing director and at 
least one other member of the affiliate's top management team. In those countries where there 
was a small population of affiliates in a target industry or when there were insufficient 
responses to the initial letters, the researchers contacted industry associations which helped to 
recruit respondents by sending out a supporting letter and/or telephoning their membership. 
The analyses presented in this paper are based on data from 160 Japanese and American MNC 
affiliates (69 Japanese affiliates and 91 American affiliates) in Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, 
Indonesia, and the Philippines. 
Interviews lasted approximately two hours each and were conducted with an average of 
two respondents per firm, most often with the managing director and one additional member of 
the top executive team at the affiliate. Questions regarding the parent company were generally 
answered by an expatriate while questions regarding the local host country were generally 
answered by host country nationals. In those cases where there were multiple responses from 
one affiliate to the same questions, those answers have been inversely weighted in the analyses 
below. 
Characteristics of the parent companies and affiliates are presented in Table 2 below. As 
shown in the table, the parent companies of the affiliates included in the study are large and 
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well-established, with an average age of 79 years, over 67,000 employees, and average sales 
of nearly $18 billion. The affiliates are, on average, over 21 years old and have an average of 
$99.7 million in sales and 981 full-time employees. Two-thirds of the affiliates were 
originally established as greenfield operations while the remaining one-third were acquisitions 
and currently, the affiliates have an average parent ownership totaling 80 .17 %. Almost half of 
the respondents hold the top position in the affiliate and almost all are in top management 
positions in the affiliates. Respondents are, on average, 46 years old, have an average of 15 
years tenure with their company and nearly all (93 %) of the respondents are male. 
Measurements 
Table 2: Sample Characteristics 
About Here 
Control variables: Affiliate size was entered as a control variable since size has systematically 
been shown to have important and significant effects on most affiliate characteristics. In this 
study, size was measured in two ways: natural log of the total affiliate sales volume 
(AFFSALES) and natural log of total number of full-time employees in the affiliate. Parallel 
regression analyses were run using these two measures for all of the analyses reported in this 
paper but because the results for number of employees are nearly identical to those derived by 
using affiliate sales as the measure of affiliate size, only the results for sales are reported in 
below. 
In addition to size, a number of previous studies have shown the age of the affiliate is an 
14 
important factor in how its various systems are configured and how much the affiliate adopts 
local versus headquarters practice (see e.g., Rosenzweig & Nohria, 1994). In the regressions 
reported below, we therefore controlled for age of the affiliate (AGE) which was calculated by 
subtracting the date of affiliate establishment from 1994. 
Percent capital of the affiliate held by the parent company (PERCAPCU) represents one 
important source of parent company control and has been shown in a number of previous 
studies to influence the parent company's ability to control affiliate management (see e.g., 
Hayashi, 1978). This variable was calculated by taking the actual percentage of the affiliate's 
capital currently held by the parent company. In Hypotheses 7 and 8 above we predicted that 
parent company ownership wi11lead to higher levels of HRM similarity between the affiliate 
and the parent company and lower levels of HRM similarity between the affiliate and local 
companies in the same industry. However, after we test for its impact on HRM similarity, we 
subsequently enter it as a control variable in the later regressions because of the important role 
that financial ownership plays in all aspects of affiliate management. 
Independent variables· Method of affiliate establishment (METDUM) was measured using a 
dummy variable (with a value of 1 for greenfield affiliate, and 0 for acquisitions). 
Management's belief in HRM as a core competence was measured on a five-point Likert-
type scale (1 =no effect, 5 = very great effect) in a series of six questions about managers' 
beliefs in the organization's HRM competence. HRMBETTE asked respondents whether 
parent company managers believed that the HRM system of the parent company was better 
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than the HRM systems of other firms while HRMSUCCE asked respondents if managers at 
the parent company believed that the HRM system of the parent company was a key to the 
company's success. HRMKEY and HRMPRAC asked parallel questions about the beliefs of 
expatriates stationed at the affiliate, and HRMLOCAL and HRMLMGR asked respondents 
about the beliefs of local managers concerning their affiliate's HRM competence. While we 
predicted that management's belief in HRM as a core competence was an important factor 
determining whether the parent company's HRM system would be transferred to the affiliate, 
we were less confident as to whose relative level of influence, parent company nationals in the 
home country, parent company nationals in the affiliate, or local managers, was the most 
important determinant of HRM similarity. We therefore included all six measures in the 
analyses below. 
Expatriate presence in the affiliate was measured in two ways: first, as the actual number 
of expatriates stationed in the affiliate (EXP AT ASS) and as a percentage of the total number of 
full-time affiliate employees (EXPATEE). It is interesting to note that contrary to popular 
stereotype, the Japanese and American affiliates in this sample have similar number of 
expatriates stationed in their Asian affiliates (American affiliates have a mean of 9.28 
expatriates while Japanese affiliates have a mean of 9.38 expatriates). Controlling for affiliate 
size, we find that American affiliates have an average of 4 % expatriates to total number of 
affiliate employees while Japanese affiliates have an average of 2 %. 
Resource dependence, although an elegant concept, is quite difficult to measure because 
it is multi-faceted. Therefore, a number of different measures were used in this study to tap 
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this construct. The first measure is a subjective determination by the respondent of how much 
the affiliate needs the parent company to attain its goals (AFFNEED). This measures the 
resource dependence by the affiliate on the parent company. In similar fashion, we asked 
respondents to indicate how much the parent company needs the affiliate to attain its goals 
(PARNEED). Both variables were measured on a 5 point Likert-type scale where 1 = not at all, 
5 =to a very great extent. This measure indicates the level of resource dependence by the 
parent company on the affiliate. We then summed the responses to these two questions to 
create an Interdependence Index between the parent company and the affiliate. 
The second set of items measures resource dependence by asking respondents what 
percentage of all goods and services produced by the affiliate are sold to the parent company 
and its affiliates (PERSOLD) and what percentage of parts and raw materials purchased by the 
affiliate are purchased from the parent company and its affiliates (PERPURCH). We used 
these two items to also create a third measure by summing the responses to create an index of 
product integration. The higher the level of intrafirm sales and purchases, the greater the 
resource dependence. 
Next, we measured resource dependence by taking affiliate sales volume as a percentage 
of total company sales volume. The greater the percentage of the affiliate's sales to total MNC 
sales, the higher the dependence of the parent company on the affiliate. Finally, the percentage 
of local sales and purchases were used as proxies for resource dependence. The greater the 
local sales (SOLDAFF) and purchases (BOUGAFF), the greater the independence of the 
affiliate and the lower the resource dependence between the parent company and the affiliate. 
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An index was also constructed by adding the percentage of the affiliate's total sales sold 
outside of the local host country and the percentage of the affiliate's total purchases outside of 




Examining the first -order correlations between the resource dependence measures (see 
Tables 3a, b and c) we see that the highest correlations are between the component variables 
and the indices which were created from these variables. For the other measures, the 
correlations are generally moderate and positive. Overall, although some of the resource 
dependence measures do show significant intercorrelations, the measures still appear to tap 
different dimensions of the construct. Therefore, all of the measures were retained but entered 
into separate models in the analyses reported below. Splitting the total sample into Japanese 
and American sub samples we see from Table 3b and Table 3c that the correlations and 
directional relationships between variables are similar, although they tend to achieve 
significance more often in the Japan sample. A discussion of the correlations between the 
resource dependence measures in the three samples (full, Japanese and American) follows: 
Ell)) Sample. Examination of the first-order correlations between the resource 
dependence measures indicates that the highest correlation is between the percentage of 
products sold locally (SOLDAFF) and the total sales volume of the affiliate (AFFSALES) (r 
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= -.3120, P < .05). The results indicate that larger affiliates tend to sell a larger percentage of 
their products in their host countries than do smaller affiliates. The relationship between the 
dependence of the parent company on the affiliate (PARNEED) and the affiliate's dependence 
on the parent company (AFFNEED) is positive and significant (r= .2854, p < .01), indicating 
that mutual interdependence is common among the affiliates and parent companies in the 
sample. 
Table 3a,b,c Rank-Order 
Correlations About Here 
The correlation between the percentage of parts and raw materials purchased by the 
affiliate locally (BOUGHAFF) and the percentage of the affiliates production sold locally 
(SOLDAFF) is .3767 (p< .01). The relationship between the percentage of the affiliate's 
products sold locally (SOLDAFF) and the dependence of the parent company on the affiliate is 
(PARNEED), not surprisingly, negative (-.2809) and significant at the .01 level. The 
percentage of the affiliate's products bought locally (BOUGHAFF) and the affiliate's 
dependence on the parent company (AFFNEED) is negative (r=-.2228, n.s.), as expected. 
The largest number of significant correlations between the various measures of resource 
dependence are found between the percentage of products sold in the local host country 
(SOLDAFF) and other measures of resource dependence, including the percentage of parts and 
raw materials purchased in the host country (BOUGHAFF) (.3767, p< .01), the percentage of 
products sold to the parent company (PERSOLD) (-.5671, p< .01), the degree to which the 
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parent company needs the affiliate to achieve its goals (P ARNEED) (-.2809, p < .01). 
American Sample. Examination of the first-order correlations between the resource 
dependence measures in this sample shows that none of the measures are significantly 
correlated. Nonetheless, the highest correlation is found between the percentage of products 
sold to the parent (PERSOLD) and the total sales volume of the affiliate (AFFSALES) (r = 
.2982). The results indicate that larger affiliates tend to sell a larger percentage of their 
products to their parents than do smaller affiliates. The relationship between the dependence 
of the parent company on the affiliate (PARNEED) and the affiliate's dependence on the 
parent company (AFFNEED) is positive (r= .1769), but not significant, indicating that mutual 
interdependence is less common among the affiliates and parent companies in the American 
sample. 
The correlation between the percentage of parts and raw materials purchased by the 
affiliate locally (BOUGHAFF) and the percentage of the affiliates production sold locally 
(SOLDAFF) is .2828, but not significant. The relationship between the percentage of the 
affiliate's products sold locally (SOLDAFF) and the dependence of the parent company on the 
affiliate is (PARNEED), not surprisingly, negative (-.2178) but not significant. The 
percentage of the affiliate's products bought locally (BOUGHAFF) and the affiliate's 
dependence on the parent company (AFFNEED) is, as expected negative (r=-.0608) but not 
significant. 
Unlike in the full sample, only the relationship between the percentage of products sold 
in the local host country (SOLDAFF) and the percentage of products sold to the parent 
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company(PERSOLD) (-.7358) is significant. 
Iapanese Sample. Examination of the first-order correlations between the resource 
dependence measures indicates that the highest correlation is between the percentage of 
products sold locally (SOLDAFF) and the total sales volume of the affiliate (AFFSALES) (r 
= -.5141, p < .05). The results indicate that larger affiliates tend to sell a larger percentage of 
their products in their host countries than do smaller affiliates. The relationship between the 
dependence of the parent company on the affiliate (PARNEED) and the affiliate's reliance on 
the parent company (AFFNEED) is positive and significant (r= .4254, p < .01), indicating that 
mutual interdependence is common among the affiliates and parent companies in the sample. 
The correlation between the percentage of parts and raw materials purchased by the 
affiliate locally (BOUGHAFF) and the percentage of the affiliates production sold locally 
(SOLDAFF) is .4942 (p < .01). The relationship between the percentage of the affiliate's 
products sold locally (SOLDAFF) and the dependence of the parent company on the affiliate is 
(PARNEED), not surprisingly, negative (-.3917) and significant at the .01 level. The 
percentage of the affiliate's products bought locally (BOUGHAFF) and the affiliate's 
dependence on the parent company (AFFNEED) is, as expected negative and significant (r=-
.3859, p< .05). 
Similar to results found in the full sample, the largest number of significant correlations 
between the various measures of resource dependence are between the percentage of products 
sold in the local host country (SOLDAFF) and other measures of resource dependence, 
including the percentage of parts and raw materials purchased in the host country 
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(BOUGHAFF) (.4972, p < .01), the percentage of products sold to the parent 
company(PERSOLD) (-.4036, p< .01), the degree to which the parent company needs the 
affiliate to achieve its goals (PARNEED) (-.3917, p< .01). 
Dependent variables· HRM similarity to the parent company and to local companies in the host 
country were measured by asking respondents how similar the HRM system at their affiliate 
was to both the parent company and to locally-owned companies operating in the same 
industry. Both the level of similarity between the human resource management system at the 
overseas affiliate to the HRM system of the parent company (P ARHRM) and the similarity of 
the HRM system at the affiliate to the HRM systems of locally-owned companies in the same 
industry (LOCHRM) were measured by using a 7 point Likert-type scale with 1 indicating "not 
at all similar" and 7 "exactly the same." 
While a number of authors have assumed an orthogonal relationship between these two 
. dimensions, we did not make such an assumption in the present study. As shown in Table 3a, 
for the sample as a whole, the correlation between the similarity of the affiliate's HRM 
system to the parent company and their HRM similarity to local companies in the same 
industry is moderate and significant (p < .01). While the two variables are negatively 
correlated these results support our initial assumption that similarity between the parent 
company and the affiliate and between local companies and the affiliate should not be treated 
as opposite ends on a single dimension. Thus, in the following analyses, both HRM system 
similarity to the parent company and HRM similarity to local companies were used as 
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dependent variables in separate regression equations. 
We see from Table 4 that in the sample as a whole the average level of similarity between 
the affiliate's HRM system and the parent company's HRM system is 4.07 (on a scale of 1 to 
7 with 1 = not at all similar and 7 = exactly the same). For the American subsample, the mean 
is 4.24 while for the Japanese subsample it is 3.95. At the same time, the mean level of 
similarity between the affiliate's HRM system and the HRM system of local companies in the 
same industry is 3.66 for the total sample, 3.58 for the American subsample, and 3.56 for the 
Japanese subsample. These results indicate that on average, the affiliates in the sample have 
HRM systems which are simultaneously moderately similar to both the parent company and 
local companies' HRM systems, although they are somewhat more similar to their parent 
companies. American affiliates are significantly more similar to their parent companies than 
are Japanese affiliates but their relative levels of local similarity are virtually identical. 




To test the hypotheses outlined above, we first performed simple univariate analyses. To 
test Hypothesis 1 that the greater the strength of top management's belief that the parent 
company possesses a competence in HRM, the greater the level of similarity between the 
parent company and overseas affiliate HRM systems, we examined the rank-order correlations 
between these variables (see Tables 3a,b,c). As mentioned above, there are 6 separate 
measures of perceived HRM competence (HRMBETTE, HRMKEY, HRMLMGR, 
HRMLOCAL, HRMPRAC, HRMSUCCE). As shown in Table 3a, for the sample as a whole 
the correlations between HRM similarity between the affiliate and the parent company 
(HRMP AR) and the six measures of perceived HRM competence are all positive and 
significant at p < .05 (HRMLOCAL) or p < .01 (HRMBETTE, HRMKEY, HRMLMGR, 
HRMPRAC, HRMSUCCE), supporting Hypothesis 1. 
Hypotheses 2a and 2b predicted that the greater the resource dependence of the parent 
company on the affiliate the greater the level of HRM similarity between the parent company 
and the affiliate (P ARHRM). To measure resource flow between the parent company and the 
affiliate, three measures were used: the percentage of raw materials and parts bought by the 
affiliate locally (BOUGHT AFF), the percentage of products sold locally (SOLD AFF), and 
the interdependence index (INTERDEX) which is an additive index of the first two variables. 
From Tables 3a, b, & c it is evident that none of the relationships in any of the three samples 
are significant. However, it should be noted that the results are in the predicted direction for 
all of the variables in both the American and Japanese subsamples. 
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Hypotheses 2c and 2d made opposite predictions, that the greater the resource 
dependence of the parent company on the affiliate, the lower the level of HRM similarity 
between the parent and the affiliate. From Tables 3a, b, & c it is apparent that the correlations 
between these variables are very small and not significant. These results do not provide 
support for either Hypothesis 2c or 2d. 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 predicted that greenfield operations would have higher levels of 
HRM similarity to the parent company and lower levels of similarity to local companies than 
affiliates founded by acquisition or joint venture. To test these two hypotheses, we conducted 
difference in means tests, comparing the mean level of HRM similarity to both the parent and 
to local companies for affiliates established as greenfield operations versus affiliates established 
as acquisitions or joint ventures. As shown in Table 4, for all three samples, the means for 
both parent-affiliate HRM similarity and local company-affiliates similarity are virtually 
identical for affiliates founded both as greenfield operations and acquisitions and joint 
ventures. The lack of significant differences in the means between the two groups indicates a 
lack of support of both Hypotheses 3 and 4. 
Hypotheses 5 and 6 predicted that expatriate presence would have a positive impact on 
HRM similarity with the parent company and a negative impact on HRM similarity with local 
companies. As shown in Tables 3a, b, & c, the correlations between the number of expatriates 
(EXPATASS) and the percentage of expatriates of total full-time affiliate employees 
(EXP ATEE) and parent company HRM similarity (P ARHRM) are not significant and are close 
to zero. In fact, the relationships are generally negative in sign, opposite to our prediction. 
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The correlations between local HRM similarity (LOCHRM) and expatriate presence 
(EXP AT ASS and EXP ATEE) are also generally small and do not reach statistical significance 
in any of the three samples. Further, only in the full sample are the relationships between the 
measures consistently in the predicted direction. Thus, these results fail to support either 
Hypotheses 5 or 6. 
Hypotheses 7 predicted that the greater the percentage of capital held by the parent 
company (PERCAPCU), the greater the level of HRM similarity between the affiliate and the 
parent company (PARHRM). As shown in Tables 3a, b, & c, the relationship between 
PERCAPCU and PARHRM reaches statistical significance in the full (r=.3316, p< .01) and 
American subsamples (r=.3052, P< .01). In the Japanese subsample, the relationship is in the 
predicted direction but does not reach statistical significance. Overall, these results therefore 
support Hypothesis 7. 
Hypothesis 8 predicted that the greater the percentage of capital held by the parent 
company (PERCAPCU), the lower the level of similarity between the affiliate and local 
companies in the same industry (LOCHRM). We see from Tables 3a, b, and c that the 
relationship between PERCAPCU and LOCHRM is in the predicted direction in the full 
sample and American subsamples, but does not achieve statistical significance. Thus, these 
results fail to support Hypothesis 8. 
While the rank-order correlational analyses are suggestive, there are a number of 
confounding variables which need to be controlled in order to fully test our predictions. We 
therefore conducted a series of regression analyses to test Hypotheses 1 through 8 and to 
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examine possible differences among the Japanese and American sub samples in the study. 
Regression Analyses 
To test hypotheses 1 through 8, while controlling for affiliate age, size, method of 
founding, and ownership, we ran regression analyses using each of the two dependent 
variables: similarity of the affiliate's HRM system to the parent company's HRM system 
(P ARHRM) and similarity of the affiliate's HRM system to the HRM systems of locally-
owned companies in the same industry (LOCHRM). Because independent and dependent 
variables were constructed using different scales, all scale variables were standardized. 
The results of the regressions on similarity to the parent's HRM system are presented in 
Table 5 below and the results for similarity between the affiliate and local companies' HRM 
systems are shown in Table 6. Each model was run for each of the three samples: the full 
sample, the Japanese subsample and the American subsample. 
Tables 5 & 6: Regression 
Analyses About Here 
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Hypothesis 1a predicted that the greater the strength of top management's belief that 
the parent company possesses a competence in HRM, the more likely that MNC is to transfer 
its HRM systems to its overseas affiliate and hence, the greater the level of HRM similarity 
between the parent company and the overseas affiliate. We find support for this prediction for 
both the full sample and the American subsample, as shown in Model 4, Table 5. Particularly 
important are the predictors HRM BETTER, HRM LOCAL MGT and HRM KEY. HRM 
BETTER asked respondents to what extent the managers in the parent company in its home 
country believe that the HRM policies and practices of the parent company as a whole are 
better than those used by other companies. HRM LOCAL MGR asked respondents to what 
extent the local managers at the affiliate believed that the HRM policies and practices of the 
parent company are a key to its success and HRM KEY asked respondents to what extent 
parent company managers stationed at the affiliate believe that the HRM policies and practices 
of the parent company are a key to its success. It is interesting to note that the beliefs of 
managers in both the affiliate and the parent company, as well as the beliefs of both local and 
home country nationals are important predictors of HRM similarity. 
Comparing the base model (Modell) with Model 4, we see that while the regressions 
are non-significant for the Japanese subsample, there is a substantial gain in the predictive 
power of Model 4 for the American subsample (adjusted R squared increases from 21 % to 
53%), indicating the important role that perceived HRM competence plays in determining 
parent-company HRM similarity. 
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Hypothesis lb predicted that the greater the strength of top management's belief that he 
parent company possesses a competence in HRM the lower the level of HRM similarity 
between the affiliate and local companies. Model 4, Table 6 shows only limited support for 
this prediction. For the sample as a whole, only HRM LOCAL MGR (to what extent the local 
managers at the affiliate believed that the HRM policies and practices of the parent company 
are a key to its success) significantly predicts local HRM similarity. None of the predictors are 
significant for the American subsample and only HRM SUCCESS (the extent to which 
managers in the parent company in its home country believe that the HRM policies and 
practices of the parent company are a key to its success) is significant for the Japanese 
subsample. 
Comparing the base model (Modell) with Model 4, which includes the perceived 
HRM competence measures we see that while the regression equations for the total and 
American subsamples remain non-significant with little explanatory power, the predictive 
power of Model 4 is significantly greater for the Japanese subsample than the base model 
(adjusted R squared for Modell =-.0821 and for Model 4= .4759, significant at p < .05). 
Hypotheses 2a through 2d offered predictions on the relationship between the level of 
dependence of the parent company on the affiliate and its ability to control that affiliate 
through its HRM system. As noted above, there are plausible arguments which would lead us 
to predict that resource dependence of the parent company on the overseas affiliate could lead 
to either higher or lower levels of HRM similarity with the parent company. Because resource 
dependence, is a multi-faceted construct, as noted above, we measured dependence using a 
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variety of measures in this study (Models 5-10 in Table 5). Looking first at the relationship 
between how much the parent company needs the affiliate to achieve its objectives (PARENT 
NEED) and affiliate sales as a percentage of parent company sales (Aff Sales/Parent Sales) we 
fmd that neither of these predictors are significant in any of the three samples. At the same 
time, for the full sample and for the American sample, the regression equation itself is 
significant (adjusted R square for the total sample =21 %; for the American sample adjusted R 
square 45%). Contrasting this model with Modell which only contains the control variables, 
the adjusted R squared increases from 10% to 21 % for the total sample and from 21 % to 45 % 
for the American sample. 
Models 5-7 examine two composite measures of resource dependence between the 
affiliate and the parent company: the Integration Index and the Interdependence Index. As 
described above, the Integration Index is an additive measure of the percentage of all goods 
and services sold by the affiliate outside of the local host country (SOLD AFF) and the 
percentage of the affiliate's total purchases that are made outside the host country (BOUGHT 
AFF). The Interdependence Index is an additive measure of the degree to which the parent 
needs the affiliate to achieve its objectives (PARENT NEED) and the degree to which the 
affiliate needs the parent company to achieve its objectives (AFF NEED). 
Separately, neither the Integration Index (Model 5) nor the Interdependence Index 
(model 6) have any significant relationships with parent company-affiliate HRM similarity for 
the full sample, the Japanese subsample or the American subsample. Combining the two 
indices in a single regression, we see in Model 7 that while the Interdependence Index is not 
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significant for any of the three subsamples, the Integration Index is significant in the Japanese 
subsample. For the Japanese affiliates in the sample, the higher the level of integration, the 
higher the level of parent company-affiliate HRM similarity. However, none of the regressions 
are significant. These results therefore fail to support our hypothesis. 
While Model 7 included the summary measure of integration, Model 10 (Table 5) 
examines the relationship between the percentage of products sold locally (SOLDAFF) and the 
percentage of parts and materials procured locally by the affiliate (BOUGHAFF) separately. 
Here we see that in all three samples the percentage of goods and services sold by the affiliate 
outside of the local host country is not an important predictor of parent-affiliate HRM 
similarity but for the total and American subsamples, it is the percentage of the affiliate's total 
purchases that are made outside of the host country which is important. The greater the 
percentage of purchases made outside of the host country, the lower the level of HRM 
similarity, opposite to our prediction. While the total regression equation for the full and 
Japanese samples do not achieve significance, the regression for the American subsample is 
significant (p < .1; adjusted R squared = 46 % ). 
Hypothesis 3 predicted that affiliates established as greenfield operations will have 
higher levels of HRM similarity between the parent company and the affiliate than affiliates 
established as joint ventures or acquisitions. Modell in Table 5 looks at this relationship, 
controlling for affiliate age, size, and parent company ownership. As shown in Modell, there 
are no significant relationships between method of founding and parent company HRM 
similarity in any of the three samples. Hypothesis 3 is therefore unsupported by the data. 
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In a parallel manner, Hypothesis 4 predicted that affiliates established as greenfield 
operations will have lower levels of HRM similarity to local companies than affiliates 
established as joint ventures or acquisitions. Modell in Table 6 shows the results of this 
analysis, controlling for affiliate age, size, and parent company ownership. In the full and 
Japanese sub samples there are no significant relationships between local HRM similarity and 
method of establishment. In the American subsample, however, there is a significant and 
positive relationship between these two variables. This relationship is opposite to that 
hypothesized since greenfield operations among American affiliates show significantly greater 
local HRM similarity than do acquisitions. These results therefore fail to support Hypothesis 4 
for any of the samples in this study. 
Hypothesis 5 predicted that the larger the expatriate presence in the affiliate, the higher 
the level of HRM similarity between the affiliate and the parent company. Model 2, Table 5 
presents the results using the number of expatriates stationed in the affiliate while Model 3 
presents the results using the percentage of expatriates to total full-time affiliate employees as 
the predictor variable. As shown in Models 2 and 3 there are no significant relationships 
between the number of expatriates or the percentage of expatriates in the affiliate and the level 
of HRM similarity between the affiliate and the parent company in the full sample, the 
Japanese subsample, or the American subsample. 
Hypothesis 6 predicted that the larger the expatriate presence in the affiliate, the lower 
the level of HRM similarity between the affiliate and local companies. These results are 
presented in Models 2 and 3 of Table 6. As shown in Model 2, we find no significant 
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relationships between number of expatriates and local HRM similarity in the total sample or 
the Japanese or American subsamples. Using percentage of expatriates as the predictor of local 
HRM similarity (Model 3, Table 6) we find an interesting difference between the subsamples. 
While there is not a significant relationship between expatriate presence and local HRM 
similarity in either the full or Japanese samples, there is a strong negative relationship between 
the two variables in the American subsample. For these affiliates, the greater the percentage of 
expatriates in the affiliate, the lower the level of HRM similarity between the affiliate and 
local companies (p < .005). For the American subsample the regression equation is also 
significant (at p < .05) and the predictor variables explain over 18 % of the variance in local 
HRM similarity. In summary, while we find no support for Hypothesis 6 in the full or 
Japanese subsamples, there is strong support, using percentage of expatriates as the measure 
of expatriate presence, in the American subsample for this hypothesis. 
Model 1 in Tables 5 and 6 look at the relationship between parent company ownership 
and HRM similarity, controlling for method of establishment, affiliate age, and affiliate size. 
As described above, Hypothesis 7 predicted that the greater the percentage of capital owned by 
the parent company the higher the level of HRM similarity between the affiliate and the parent 
company. As shown in Table 5 (Model 1) there is no evidence for the sample as a whole or the 
Japanese and American sub samples to support this proposition. In all three cases, the 
relationship between HRM similarity and the predictor variable is very small and non-
significant. 
Hypothesis 8 predicted that the greater the percentage of capital owned by the parent 
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company the lower the level of HRM similarity between the affiliate and local companies. As 
shown in Table 6 (Modell), we again find no support for this prediction in the full sample or 
the two subsamples. Hence, the data lead us to reject Hypotheses 7 and 8. 
IV. Discussion and Conclusions 
As outlined a the beginning of this paper, we explored the answers to four research 
questions: 1. To what extent do MNCs transfer their parent company HRM systems overseas 
versus adopt local practices?; 2. What are the key determinants which lead MNCs to transfer 
their parent company HRM systems overseas?; 3. What are the key determinants which lead 
MNCs to use local HRM systems in their overseas affiliates?; and 4. Are there any differences 
in the above relationships between those affiliates with Japanese parent companies and those 
with American parent companies? We saw from the means for each of the samples in the study 
that both Japanese and American firms have moderate levels of HRM similarity to both local 
companies and to their parent companies, with slightly higher levels of similarity to the parent 
than to local companies (see Table 4 above). These MNCs therefore do not chose between 
exporting the parent company system overseas or adapting to local conditions but take a hybrid 
approach, combining elements of both in their Asian affiliates. Japanese and American 
affiliates have nearly identical levels of local HRM similarity although the American affiliates 
in the sample have significantly higher levels of parent-company HRM similarity than their 
Japanese counterparts. These results are interesting and counterintuitive given the widespread 
stereotype that it is Japanese firms which tend to export their management systems overseas. 
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In looking at the data bearing on the second research question concerning the key 
determinants which lead MNCs to transfer their parent company HRM systems overseas, we 
saw from the rank-order correlations and from the regression equations that for both the 
sample as a whole and for the American subsample, perceived HRM competence and affiliate 
age are critical factors. For the Japanese subsample, none of the predictor variables appear to 
predict the level of parent company-affiliate HRM similarity. Whether the affiliate was 
founded as a greenfield operation or as an acquisition or joint venture, the level of parent 
company ownership, the size of the affiliate, and the level of resource dependence between the 
affiliate and the affiliate were all found to be non-significant predictors of parent company-
affiliate HRM similarity. 
Turning to the third research question concerning the key determinants which lead MNCs 
to use local HRM systems in their overseas affiliates, we found that the base model (Modell, 
Table 6), is not significant for any of the samples and only method of establishment in the 
American sample significantly predicts local company-affiliate HRM similarity. Controlling 
for interdependence, however (Model 6) we find that for the American affiliates, affiliate age 
is positively and significantly related to affiliate-local company HRM similarity. The older the 
affiliate, the higher the HRM similarity between the affiliate and local companies. 
There are fewer significant relationships between the predictor variables and HRM 
similarity in the Japanese subsample, although there is some evidence that perceived HRM 
competence among parent company managers does reduce the level of affiliate-local company 
HRM similarity. Finally, in the American subsample, percentage of expatriates has a strong 
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negative effect on local company HRM similarity, although there is no similar relationship 
within the Japanese subsample. In addition, if percentage of expatriates stationed in the 
affiliate is entered as a control variable (Model 3), parent company ownership becomes 
significant for the American affiliates. In this case, controlling for expatriate presence, the 
greater the parent company ownership, the lower the level of affiliate-local company HRM 
similarity. 
In summary, the control variables of affiliate establishment method, affiliate age, size, 
and parent company ownership are not related to either HRM similarity with the parent 
company or local companies in the full sample or Japanese subsample. For the American 
subsample, only affiliate age is a significant predictor of parent company similarity (Modell, 
Table 5) and only method of establishment is significant for the American subsample for local 
HRM similarity (see Modell, Table 6). These results are in contradiction to the assumptions 
of most writers in this field and to the recent fmdings of Rosenzweig and Nohria (1994) for a 
sample of U.S. affiliates of foreign-based MNCs. 
In addition, resource dependence does not appear to play an important role in the level of 
HRM similarity between the affiliate and local companies or between the affiliate and the 
parent company. HRM similarity is admittedly a partial and proxy measure for parent 
company control and further research is necessary to tease out whether our results are 
indicative of the nature of the relationship between the variables themselves or are an artifact 
of our measures. 
The lack of a relationship between expatriate presence and HRM similarity with the 
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parent company in the total and Japanese samples also contradicts the results found by 
Rosenzweig and Nohria (1994) that higher expatriate presence leads to lower levels of 
similarity between the affiliate and local practices. Although there are no significant 
relationships between expatriate presence and local HRM similarity for the total or Japanese 
subsample, the results from the American subsample that percentage of expatriates in the 
affiliate is associated with lower levels of local company-affiliate HRM similarity (Table 6, 
Model 3) do support Rosenzweig and Nohria's (1994) findings. In the American affiliates, the 
presence of expatriates suppresses the adoption of local HRM systems but does not enhance the 
exportation of parent company systems overseas. In the Japanese affiliates, on the other hand, 
expatriates do not seem to be important to the adaptation or exportation of HRM systems to the 
affiliate. 
These results, in addition to the relatively modest correlation between the measures of 
affiliate-parent company HRM similarity and affiliate-local company HRM similarity, should 
be taken into account when conceptualizing and designing future studies. As highlighted in 
Tables 3a,b, and c, similarity to local companies and similarity to the parent company do not 
represent opposite ends of a single continuum but should be measured and tested 
independently. MNCs can, and in this study do, adapt their systems to fit local norms and 
export their parent company systems overseas. 
Our fourth and final research question focused on the differences between Japanese and 
American affiliates in the sample. While we do find some notable differences between the two 
subsamples (as described above), overall, there are far more similarities among the American 
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and Japanese affiliates than differences between them. 
In order to be successful in the complex global economic environment, MNCs must 
constantly balance the need for global integration versus local differentiation. In order to 
achieve this balance, the MNC must draw on its internal resources (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; 
Collis, 1992; Evans & Doz, 1992; Pucik, 1992) and the IHRM system of the MNC is a 
critical internal resource necessary for the firm to manage this duality (Taylor, et al., 1995). 
The results from this study indicate that Japanese and American MNCs are simultaneously 
integrating and differentiating their HRM systems. 
The results from this study also indicate that while MNCs respond to increased 
integration between the operations of the MNC as a whole and the affiliate with higher levels 
of integration between the affiliate and parent company's HRM system, HRM system 
similarity is also influenced by the belief of top management at the parent company that their 
parent company HRM system is a core competency. While most researchers have focused on 
"objective" factors to explain HRM similarity, equally important are subjective factors and 
perceptions. In this study the data indicate that the traditional explanatory factors such as 
affiliate age, size, ownership, etc. are not important predictors of HRM similarity. Whether 
this reflects the unique characteristics of the three industries included in this study, factors 
common to the ASEAN countries, Japanese or American MNCs, or some other factor is not 
clear. Clearly, future research is needed to reconcile these results with those from earlier 
studies. As FDI continues to play an increasingly important role in the attempts of MNCs to 
compete internationally, issues such as the determinants and outcomes of affiliate human 
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resource management systems will become even more critical to MNCs and a key factor in 
their long-term success and viability. 
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Table 1: Japanese Investment in ASEAN 
(in U.S. $ million) 
1988 1989 1990 
Indonesia 586 631 1105 
Malaysia 387 673 725 
Philippines 134 202 258 
Singapore 747 1902 840 
Thailand 859 1276 1154 
Total 2713 4684 4082 
1991 1992 1993 
1193 1357 813 
880 704 800 
203 160 207 
613 670 644 
807 657 578 
3696 3867 3042 
(Sources: Nihon Boeki Shlnkokai, Nihon no toshi, 1989-93 cited in Sudo, 1994: 65; Keizai 
Koho Center, 1994: 55) 
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Table 2: Number of Japanese Afiiliates in the Sample By Country and Industry 
Elec- Auto- Chern.! Other 
tronics motive Pharm. 
Singapore 9 5 4 3 
Malaysia 2 8 2 4 
Indonesia 4 5 2 2 
Philippines 1 5 1 3 
Thailand 1 6 0 2 
Total 17 29 9 14 69 I 
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Table 3: Parent Company, Af'f"iliate and Respondent Characteristics 
Variable Mean (Standard 
DevlationY 
Parent Co. 
Age of Parent 69.00Zrears (48.02 
Sales Volume ($) ~33,290,000,000 
$103 400 000 000) 
# Employees 37,698 
(690111 
Affiliate 
Age of affiliate [6.39 ~rears 10.48 
Sales Volume ($) $102,984,309 
($117235 328) 
# Employees 873.01 
(933.50) 
% Parent owned 66.29% 
(29.14%) 





Position in co. 
-M~g. Director 46.2% 
-Div./Dept. Head 27.3% 
-Other mgmt. 26.5% 





Age ~3.6~) 9.46 
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Table 4a: Descriptive Statistics 
V"";,,hl,. M .. <on ~tn n"", .. 6: • l\., 
J?arhrm. nf '·H2M tn "" .... nt N'L 3.70 1.42 1.00 7.00 
I,.oshnn nf' J.JDM tn In,.,,1 ,.n'~ 3.94 1.52 1.00 7.00 
~J!p~ .f' Qffil;"t~ 16.39 10.48 2.00 59.00 
ep:W;~£V.l h .. 1A h n" .... nt 66.29 29.14 15% 100% 
~~1!I~s . <off 9.52 8.94 1.00 39.00 
Expatee'/f' .. IL";~. 2% 3% 0% 18% 
1l~~~~nQ ...... t ,.". 69.00 years 48.02 17.00 221.00 
J;~l;Qt ...... ~ 873.01 933.50 29.00 5000.00 
J:arees •• 37698.19 69011.90 500.00 252000.0 
Mf~~~ll1"''' nf' "ffil;"t .. S102,984,309 117,235,328 350,000 400,000,000 
~~t1e~ll1m ... nf "" .... nt .. n 33.29 (SB) 103.4 (SB) S30,4OO,000 500 (SB) 
~~~Jl tJAe ~~ ~n"~~s 3.01 1.15 1.00 5.00 
~~!th,.~et~f~y!!~,,~ .. 3.93 1.05 1.00 5.00 
lJ:>u~ff o 0 }D.Ruts purchased from 44.90% 28.11 0 100 
~1~f!11'~ ~n1A tn .. ,,_ .. t ,.n 63.93% 37.69 0 100 
Integr8.2t ;nn .. y 82.10 57.17 0 193.00 
loteJ'{jex 
. ;nrl",y 6.96 1.86 2.00 10.00 
~~, be*! .. ~~t,parent 3.49 1.01 1.00 5.00 
~nnspcce ~jic f!atCi~fJiigr~ be e~.!!!~t HRM 3.99 .91 1.00 5.00 
Y~~<;.!i;t ~al,]j.8.M at 3.75 1.13 1.00 5.00 
~~~1;..8'f*e!.~J-J,,!lRM at 3.45 1.08 1.00 5.00 
H~dlsJl.~l?~~W~~ fIf!il'lJ!~ 4.03 .80 2.00 5.00 
~dfsr,_belie{.ili~lff,.~~f 3.57 .81 1.50 5.00 
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Table 4b: Correlation Matrix 
2 3 .., 6 8 9 10 11 
1) Local HRM 1.00 
2) Pan'lIt HRM -0.19 l.uO 
3) Age of Affiliatl' -0.0':- 0.12 1.00 
4) CUlTent Percellt Capital 0.10 o.n -0.12 1.00 
5) l\lelhod Established (Dummy) om -0.07 -0. J:~ 0.07 1.00 
6) Log of Sales U.04 0.09 -0.18 0.20 .'1:2. LOU 
") jI," umber of Expatriatt's -0.19 -0.01 0.0.:1 0.26 0.13 .61~'" 1.00 
8) Pl'rct'lltagt' of Expatriatt's 0.21 -0.09 -0.23 .39 .... -0.11 -O.IIS 0.:21 1.00 
9) Pal'ellt HRM is Belt" .. (Parent Co. Mgr.) -0.19 0.23 0.05 -0.07 -0.13 -0.01 0.07 0.14 1.00 
10) Affiliatt' HRi\l is Bl·tter (Parent Co. Mgrs.) -:!9- 29~ -0.01 0.0., -0 12 -0.09 0.1(, -001 r·· l.on 
11) Parent HR:\1 is Kt'y (Ex pats) -O.uS 0.2~ -0.0') O.OS -o.OS O.IS -0.02 0.1~ .6~"'1oC .5.:I M• 1.00 
12) Pan'nt HRi\J is Key (Affiliate Co. i\Igr.) -0.0) .::!8· -0.10 -0.15 -0.05 0.01 -0.12 U.1.:1 . 56::!"''' 5.:1 •• i7.~ 
13) Affiliatt' HR:\1 is B .. tler (Expats) -.39"· .31- 0.03 000 O.OS 0.06 O.u<; -0.10 .~9"'" . .:I('~~ .:I4·~ 
1.:1) Parent HR1\l is Bettl'r (Affiliatt' Co. :\lgrs.) -.53"- O.::!'i 0.01 -0.:!~ 0.11 0.03 0.13 -0.15 .27- u.::. 0.16 
15) hltt'gration Iudl'x 0.:211 O.::!:2 -0.::!6 .39· -0.03 056 O.::!I 0.3' 0.11 ().O I 0.18 
16) Inlt'rdl"pl"lldl'lIl'" Index 0.07 om -0.01 0.21 -0 II~ 0.19 .~S'" 0.:20 O.I::! 11.11 0.23 
1 ") Bought Affiliatt' -0.26 -0.11i 0.20 -0.1-1 0.13 -(l,S: -O.<)S .n.33 -0.19 -O.O~ -0.23 
18) Sold Afflllittf" -0.06 -0.11 0.::5 -.63** -0.06 -.51- -0.29 -.3'- -1J()9 0.01 -0.17 
19) Affiliatt' !lil't'd 0.04 0.0\1 -0.11 -0.0-1 OK 0.'23 0.18 0.15 0.15 0.211 .31)-
20) Parent Need 0.06 -0.1.1-1 O.oS .34~ -0.17 0.16 .3I~ o i~ 0.(1) oou uO\l 
12 13 14 15 16 1" 18 19 20 
l:!) Part"nl HH.:\1 is KI')' (Affilial(" Co .. \lgr.) l.ull 
13) Affilialf' HR\( is Bt'tll'r (bpah) jO*~ 1.110 
14) Part'nt IIRi\I is Belll"r (.-\fliliall· ('0. :\ign.) 31~ 4\1·~ LOU 
15) Intt'gralion huJex iI.OO O.l'-l -0.09 1.0n 
16) Iuterdept'ndl'lll'l" illdt"x 0.\)7 0.1)3 -1l20 0.30 1.01) 
1") Bought Affiliatf' 11.111) -1l.OS 0.10 -.S~*"" -O.3.~ 1.00 
H!) Sold Affiliatt" 0.11 -0.1.1·1 11,05 _.9l)M. _.3~1oC .·~9·" 1.00 
1 'J) Afriliall,' l'it't"d 017 0.17 -00-1 O.::!G .S.··· -.37* -0.17 1.1.111 .~3·· 
2l}) Parl"nt Nl"l"d -0.06 -I),1i.l -U.::5 0.29 .S6"'- -0.2:! -:';J.* .·D"~ 1.00 
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Table 4c: Difference in Means Tests on Parent-Alriliate HRM Similarity and Local 
Company-Affiliate Similarity Between Greenfield and Acquisitions and Joint Ventures 
Similarity of Affiliate HRM to 
Local Companies 
Similarity of Affiliate HRM to 
Parent Company 
Significance of 












Table S: Regression Results for Parent Company-AtT'iliate fiRM Similarity 
Variable Modell Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model S 
Beta (S.E.) Beta (S.E.) Beta (S.E.) Beta (S.E.) 
Beta (S.E.) 
Intercept -1.0745 -4.472 -2.9358 -1.1757 -8.8267 (2.9964) (3.6461) (3;073) (2.7980) (3.6600) 
Est. Method -.1096 .1036 -.0359 .0916 1.3680* (.5982) (.6399) (.5717) (.5394) (.4446) 
Aff. Age .0140 -.0091 -.0225 .0232 .0966* (.0254) (.0330) (.0313) (.0251) (.0246) 
~ofAff. .0707 .3073 .2274 .0542 .4567 S es (.1717) (.2236) (.1871) (.1614) (.1914) 
% Parent -.0014 -.0031 -.0048 .0017 -.0137 
Ownershin (.0103) (.0104) (.0109) (.0135) (.0071) 
# Expats -.0463 (.0351) 
% Expats .5112 (11.5475) 
HRMBETT .2305 (.6019) 
HRMLOCA .5459 (.5381) 
HRMPRAC .0449 (.4425) 
HRMSUCC -.0813 (.4730) 
HRMLMGR .1845 (.4772) 










R square .0251 .1461 .1453 .4753 .8335 
Adjusted R -.2112 -.1589 -.1835 -.0770 .5956 
sauare (1.1596) (1.1529) (1.060) (.9953) (.4828) 
~~ficance N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. 
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Table 5: Regression Results for Parent Company-Afiiliate HRM Similarity (continued) 
V::trh.hJp MnrlpJ 6 MnrlpJ 7 l\"'~..:1~1 R MnrlpJ 9 Model 10 
~~~-) ~~e~_) ~~~~-) ¥c;:ete \ ~~e~) 
Intercept 
-l2OF ( .19 8) (l~t6~) (~j~a8) (l~~~a) -F 99°f ( .i5 3 
Est. Method -.0721 (.6261) 2.4193 (1.0445) -. A693 (. 405) (gl19) t::zgI~* 
Aff. Age t6i13) .1519 (.0 18) (?ct~~7) tdP~5) .90:[6* (.0 13) 
~esof Aff. (~11§6) .4090 et[(8) .03gJ .6230 (.2189) (.1 7) (.1983) 










feterdeg~- -.3660 (:~~~) ence ex (.2914) 
PARNEED (:~~~) 
AFFNEED eil§l) 
Mfi S1'i3/ arent es ·t.8J,~5) 
SOLDAFF t:?-fla) 
BOUGHAFF ('~8~~\ 
R square .1201 .9655 .1688 .4393 .9123 
A~tedR 
sq e -.18,4 (1.1 47) (~tld3) -2m (i.18 7) (~ftS4) .701& (.41 ) 
~~ficance N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. .16 
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Table 6: Regression Results for Local Company-Affiliate HRM Similarity 
V~ri~hJp MnrlpJ 1 MnrlpJ 2 MnrlpJ ~ Mnl'fpJ .::l MnrlpJ ~ 
p~e~.) p'~e~ ) p'~e~ ) p.~~ ) p'~e~_) 
Intercept d~flI9) - 13~~ (2.8 6) d:?J21) li~if!8) -!6'16~8* ( .0 4 ) 
Est. Method (~.wl2) egU9) e]~8) -.0057 (.3383) (~gtg6) 
Aff. Age (?oiflO) td1g2) (?d~) -.0~03 (.0 14) .07l~ (.0 9) 
~sof Aff. -.063~ (.141 ) (:m~) -.0753 (.1580) -.066~ (.114 ) .7i}4* (. 79) 
~ Parellt td818) td&'83) tdM2) (~i5) .O~ (. 6) 
# Expats. -.0046 (.0283) 





- ~9!2* ( 9 1) 
HRMLMGR (jijH) 
HRMKEY (~Jito) 







R square .1319 .1416 .1726 .7641 .8278 
~~ia~tt;! (:g~~~) (:~m) (:~~~§) (~~lJ3) .5407 (.6311) 
~~ficance N.S. N.S. N.S. . 0613 N.S . 
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